ARCO's Abolitionists - A Vegan Forum

I recently had to explain on another forum why the hell I said that plants are "things" and therefore cannot be "respected". I hope this can help here.

-Hey people,

I was the “Cartesian guy” who referred to plants as “things”, also saying that we cannot “respect” them for the same reason we cannot “respect” a car, a chair or a spermatozoid.

English is not my first language, and I still have many flaws with it. Why am I saying this? Because I remember reading somewhere, about the “living things” that inhabit this planet. So I assumed that, in English, you make a difference between “living things” and “living beings” (if this is misguided please correct me.) This made sense to me, since I never felt comfortable calling a tumor a living “being”. Yep, they´re very much alive, but I think they are living “things”.

Why do I think this? Because I believe that it is an absolute necessity to be sentient and self-aware, to be a “being”, a “somebody”. Sentience comes from the capability to feel pain and pleasure. To be aware of these unique “experiences”, to have unique “interests” –the concept of “consciousness”- form a part of every sentient life. An “individual” is, therefore, born.

As far as human knowledge goes, there are many characteristics that are essential to be a sentient being (nervous system –be it central, peripheral or gangliar-, benzodiazepine receptors, endorphins, etc.)
That´s why we say, that plants are not sentient. If there is no sentience, there are no “experiences”. If there are no “experiences” there cannot be “interests”. If there are no “interests” there cannot be a “somebody”. If you are not a “somebody” you´re a “something”. That´s why I said that I believe plants to be “things”. I didn´t mean that they are the same as a TV or a table. They are alive, of course. But that doesn´t mean they are “somebody”.

For example, I am a sentient individual. I´m made of billions and billions of living things. Nevertheless, all of those billions and billions of living things make just ONE living “being” –ME-.
My blood cells are alive, but they are not sentient, they have no “conscience”, they have no interests of their own. My spermatozoids are alive, but they are not sentient, they have no “conscience”, they have no interests of their own. I do depend, more or less, on them but they are still living “things”. They are a part of ONE living “being”.

I think it might be important to say that “sentience” is not equal to “sensitiveness”. EVERY living form is “sensitive”. They are sensitive to external conditions, and they respond to them. This is how they stay alive, how they reproduce, etc. But, as I wrote before, “sentience” is a whole different concept. To acknowledge that plants are “sentient” we would have to change the very definition of “sentience”.

And we cannot forget that “sentience” works as a defense system. This allows a sentient being to run away or fight back to whatever might be harming her/him. It is also associated with memory, so the sentient being can avoid the same harmful situations. The notion that “sentience” would serve no purpose to plants, logically follows.

Furthermore, there are some animals that have been proved not-to-be sentient (like sponges for instance). There are many other animals that we do not know for sure if they are sentient or not, like some insects.

We can also see this clearer from other human beings. For example, someone who has lost mobility (sentience) below her hips can tell you, right away, that she doesn´t feel pain if you do a little cut on her legs. Nevertheless, her body will have a reaction (cause of its sensitiveness) and will probably heal that cut. But that person didn´t feel pain at all.
She is, indeed, a sentient being. Her legs are still a part of her body. But the connections that make “sentience” below her hips possible are not longer there, so she cannot feel pain.

This is why, I believe you cannot “hurt” a plant – or a blood cell, a tumor, a spermatozoid, a brain-dead human, a chair, or a car-. Some of them are alive, the others are not. But all of them share at least one characteristic. They are not sentient. For the same reason, I believe that since you cannot “hurt” or “please” them, you cannot “respect” them.

This doesn´t mean that I will go out and kill every plant I see, or cut the legs of a human who lost mobility below her hips or destroy all of my blood cells. Of course not.
I do not believe that “sentience” is some kind of “justification” to destroy what is non-sentient. Not at all. As i´ve said earlier, I understand that everything in this world (and even on this universe) is connected, that everything depends on everything and so on. It would be absolutely foolish to think otherwise (yet, this foolishness has taken over the majority of the human population.)

Maybe my notion of who or what you can “respect” or not it´s too intricate, pseudo-philosophical and/or pseudo-intellectual. To be honest, I do talk about “respect” towards plants or even “nature” from time to time, when speaking to others about the absolute necessity of living in harmony with everything in this world. I talk about “respecting” plants by not killing them or destroying them without a true necessity. I think it is a better way to communicate it to others, for the sake of the arguments –otherwise I would have to say all the garbage I´ve written here already!-

If you believe there is something deeper, that somehow represents some kind of "consciousness" or "sentience" on plants on another level (maybe spiritual), I can`t really argue. I do not know anything about it (sadly, I`m too mundane for that.) But, if that is what you believe, the words you`re using ("consciousness" and "sentience") are not being used properly.-

Gary L. Francione wrote:That is, Carson had a moral obligation that concerned the plants, but was not owed to the plants. The obligation was owed to the Navajo, who were sentient beings with interests. (And if there were sentient nonhumans living in those fields, the Carson's obligation would be owed directly to them as well.)

Carson had a moral obligation not to burn the plants because doing so could have been reasonably expected to cause harm. It's irrelevant to whom that obligation concerned or was owed, or not.

The same goes for a rock. I have an obligation not to throw the rock at you. But that is an obligation I owe to you and not to the rock. I may have an obligation not to cut down a tree, but that is a moral obligation that I owe to the sentient beings (birds, squirrels, etc.) who live in the tree, and not to the tree per se.

Ditto. The preoccupation with who may or may not be concerned is an unnecessary distraction. The question is one of harm and its necessity. That's all.

In any event, it is sentience, and not "unnecessary harm" to nonsentients, that determines the moral situation here.

No. It is "unnecessary harm" without consideration of sentience that determines the moral situation here and elsewhere.

I challenge you to present an example of unnecessary harm upon which we can agree that it is unnecessarily harmful, and then argue that it is also moral. You are free to use sentient and/or nonsentient beings as you like. If your position is correct -- that sentience is the element determining morality -- then you should have no trouble finding such an example that is exclusive to non-sentient beings, since anything done to non-sentient beings is also not immoral, by your view. But I believe that you cannot because anything that fits that criteria is either necessary or not harmful.

It is coincidental that immoral acts and sentient victims are always associated, in your world, because you cannot see any harm as it may pertain to non-sentients. But that fact only underscores that your position of the requirement for sentience is implicitly derived from your perception of harm, and that, in fact your position is no unnecessary harm. You frame it in terms of the interests of sentients because your perception of harm happens to be limited to sentients. As you say, we are in agreement.

However, I prefer to frame it without biasing the principle by my perceptions. "No unnecessary harm" includes your position but does not require revision should the sentience of plants, rocks or whatever come into question at some future time. It is a principle that transcends any limitations in personal perceptions and is inclusive of those who may hold different world views, particularly regarding the sentient nature of beings.

As for the possibility that plants are sentient, the same goes for the rock. Many things are logically possible, but not plausible. Plants do not have any of the characteristics that we associate with sentience. There is no reason for us to believe that plants are sentient. They may be, but, again, my fence may walk away but that would not be a plausible concern on my part.

This is true but subject to revision based upon new evidence as it may arise. When choosing between two principles, both of which serve the purpose, It is better to choose the principle that is not based upon assumptions that cannot be proven, no matter how plausible.

Plausibility is not something to be dismissed lightly. To the extent that those of us who accept an animal rights position treat as plausible the notion that plants may be sentient, we undercut our argument about not eating nonhuman animals. We ought not to do that unless plant sentience is plausible, which, given the extant empirical evidence, it is not.

Agreed. But then animal rights is just as well based upon the principle of no unnecessary harm without the dependence upon the truth or falsehood of the sentience of things. Remember we have already revised our view of sentience once. There was a time when only humans were thought to be sentient. There may come a time when our view of the non-sentience of plants will seem as ridiculous as that prior view of the non-sentience of animals does now. Our principles should be correct enough to transcend our ignorances.

sheepdog wrote:

Gary L. Francione wrote:That is, Carson had a moral obligation that concerned the plants, but was not owed to the plants. The obligation was owed to the Navajo, who were sentient beings with interests. (And if there were sentient nonhumans living in those fields, the Carson's obligation would be owed directly to them as well.)

Carson had a moral obligation not to burn the plants because doing so could have been reasonably expected to cause harm. It's irrelevant to whom that obligation concerned or was owed, or not.

The same goes for a rock. I have an obligation not to throw the rock at you. But that is an obligation I owe to you and not to the rock. I may have an obligation not to cut down a tree, but that is a moral obligation that I owe to the sentient beings (birds, squirrels, etc.) who live in the tree, and not to the tree per se.

Ditto. The preoccupation with who may or may not be concerned is an unnecessary distraction. The question is one of harm and its necessity. That's all.

In any event, it is sentience, and not "unnecessary harm" to nonsentients, that determines the moral situation here.

No. It is "unnecessary harm" without consideration of sentience that determines the moral situation here and elsewhere.

I challenge you to present an example of unnecessary harm upon which we can agree that it is unnecessarily harmful, and then argue that it is also moral. You are free to use sentient and/or nonsentient beings as you like. If your position is correct -- that sentience is the element determining morality -- then you should have no trouble finding such an example that is exclusive to non-sentient beings, since anything done to non-sentient beings is also not immoral, by your view. But I believe that you cannot because anything that fits that criteria is either necessary or not harmful.

It is coincidental that immoral acts and sentient victims are always associated, in your world, because you cannot see any harm as it may pertain to non-sentients. But that fact only underscores that your position of the requirement for sentience is implicitly derived from your perception of harm, and that, in fact your position is no unnecessary harm. You frame it in terms of the interests of sentients because your perception of harm happens to be limited to sentients. As you say, we are in agreement.

However, I prefer to frame it without biasing the principle by my perceptions. "No unnecessary harm" includes your position but does not require revision should the sentience of plants, rocks or whatever come into question at some future time. It is a principle that transcends any limitations in personal perceptions and is inclusive of those who may hold different world views, particularly regarding the sentient nature of beings.

As for the possibility that plants are sentient, the same goes for the rock. Many things are logically possible, but not plausible. Plants do not have any of the characteristics that we associate with sentience. There is no reason for us to believe that plants are sentient. They may be, but, again, my fence may walk away but that would not be a plausible concern on my part.

This is true but subject to revision based upon new evidence as it may arise. When choosing between two principles, both of which serve the purpose, It is better to choose the principle that is not based upon assumptions that cannot be proven, no matter how plausible.

Plausibility is not something to be dismissed lightly. To the extent that those of us who accept an animal rights position treat as plausible the notion that plants may be sentient, we undercut our argument about not eating nonhuman animals. We ought not to do that unless plant sentience is plausible, which, given the extant empirical evidence, it is not.

Agreed. But then animal rights is just as well based upon the principle of no unnecessary harm without the dependence upon the truth or falsehood of the sentience of things. Remember we have already revised our view of sentience once. There was a time when only humans were thought to be sentient. There may come a time when our view of the non-sentience of plants will seem as ridiculous as that prior view of the non-sentience of animals does now. Our principles should be correct enough to transcend our ignorances.

What you are now saying is completely inconsistent with what you said earlier. But it is clear we are not going anywhere here.

GLF

Samuel, thank you for your very clear and illustrative expositions on the subject. I find them to be very helpful to those who have problems grasping the concept of sentience and harm immediately but are willing to learn. Sadly, there are some people roaming the forums who keep being contrary obviously for the sake of being contrary, and who do not even realize that their arguments are self-contradictory.

As Gary has pointed out on the general ARCO board, there is nothing more dangerous than saying that there is no distinction between "to be alive" and "to be sentient" which is coherent with the notion that we can only make a subjective distinction between plants and nonhumans, the ideological ground on which there is also no or only a subjective distinction between, referring to what Gary said earlier in this thread (p. 2), "harvesting" "fur animals" and harvesting grain.

Gary L. Francione wrote:What you are now saying is completely inconsistent with what you said earlier. But it is clear we are not going anywhere here.

GLF

I would appreciate an indication of the inconsistencies you see for my own understanding. I promise not to debate them if you wish.

I fear we disposed of the salad problem too quickly though. Even assuming plants are not sentient it appears the problem that you posed is a trivial example of wastefulness. If we were to change the example to someone who purchased a truckload of salad every day and spent the day putting it down garbage disposals, that would make the waste of it clearer.

Certainly, wastefulness is immoral. The salad had to be grown somewhere and when harvested there were animals caught in the harvest. Even if grown indoors the greenhouse was put on land taken from animal habitat. The disposal of the salad creates effluent that harms water environments for those who live there.

So, in fact, the salad problem is immoral for reasons of wastefulness, albeit a trivial example.

These are all harms not given consideration by the tunnel vision of veganism, apparently. But they are considered from the larger perspective of no unnecessary harm.

I do not think that it will be productive to continue the debate about plants, hormonal sentience, etc.

I do, however, want to correct something stated by sheepdog that, as a historical matter, is just plain wrong.

Sheepdog says that:

Remember we have already revised our view of sentience once. There was a time when only humans were thought to be sentient.

This is incorrect. With the possible exception of Descartes, no one really doubted that nonhumans were sentient. I say "possible exception of Descartes" because it is not 100% clear that even he really believed that animals were, as he called them, "automatons" that were not sentient.

For the most part, humans have historically recognized that nonhumans are sentient and that they have interests, but have maintained that we ignore those interests because animals lack some supposedly uniquely human characteristic (rationality, abstract thought, symbolic communication, etc.). For example, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant did not doubt that animals were sentient, but he maintained that we could not have moral obligations that we owe directly to animals because they are (supposedly) not rational. This is the case for most of the people who argued that nonhumans should be excluded from the moral community. They did not doubt that nonhumans were sentient; they argued that sentience was not sufficient for membership in the moral community.

Even Bentham, who maintained that sentience was sufficient for moral standing, believed that because nonhumans were (supposedly) not self aware, they had no interest in continued existence, so we could use them if we did not impose "unnecessary" suffering on them. That is, according to Bentham, animals did not care that we used them; they care only about how we used them.

Singer takes the same view (pretty much) as did Bentham.

I maintain that if a being is sentient, the being is necessarily self-aware for purposes of not being used at all as a human resource.

I feel it is important to correct this particular histrorical error that sheepdog made, and that we understand the historical treatment of sentience.

I am not going to participate further in the discussion about plant sentience because there is nothing more that I can add and, as I said, I find the position that plants are sentient to be implausible and, frankly, silly.

GLF

Gary L. Francione wrote:Sheepdog says that:

Remember we have already revised our view of sentience once. There was a time when only humans were thought to be sentient.

This is incorrect. With the possible exception of Descartes, no one really doubted that nonhumans were sentient. I say "possible exception of Descartes" because it is not 100% clear that even he really believed that animals were, as he called them, "automatons" that were not sentient.

For the most part, humans have historically recognized that nonhumans are sentient and that they have interests, but have maintained that we ignore those interests because animals lack some supposedly uniquely human characteristic (rationality, abstract thought, symbolic communication, etc.). For example, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant did not doubt that animals were sentient, but he maintained that we could not have moral obligations that we owe directly to animals because they are (supposedly) not rational. This is the case for most of the people who argued that nonhumans should be excluded from the moral community. They did not doubt that nonhumans were sentient; they argued that sentience was not sufficient for membership in the moral community.

Even Bentham, who maintained that sentience was sufficient for moral standing, believed that because nonhumans were (supposedly) not self aware, they had no interest in continued existence, so we could use them if we did not impose "unnecessary" suffering on them. That is, according to Bentham, animals did not care that we used them; they care only about how we used them.

Singer takes the same view (pretty much) as did Bentham.

I maintain that if a being is sentient, the being is necessarily self-aware for purposes of not being used at all as a human resource.
GLF

This is a good point and I stand corrected.

Still it does ignore the historical facts of the evolution of the idea of sentience. I site the following source as support:

Increasing self-awareness among animals indicates more responsibilities and duties
towards them. Saying that, it follows those animals cannot be viewed in a monistic way (one
species), because degrees of awareness are indeed plausible. On the ‘lowest level’ there is
rudimentary or primitive awareness where living beings have the capacity for sense
perception, but surely not the capacity for enjoyment or suffering. Primitive awareness could
not be sufficient for invoking duties towards avoiding suffering and killing. Differences in
degrees of consciousness are morally significant in as far as they bear upon the nature and
quality of the enjoyment or suffering of the beings concerned, and becoming objects of one’s
own attention. Jonas’ phenomenology of animal existences serves as a meaningful bridge
from sentience to aspects beyond sentience. He accepts the reality of animal feelings and
emotions while feeling is associated with need. A monistic explanation that all animals are
driven by instincts only is thus a gross oversimplification. Insights from evolutionary and
cognitive sciences have begun to revolutionise our understanding of animal minds as we
share the planet with thinking animals. Autonomy (freedom), self-consciousness,
transcendence and rationality go together. Necessary conditions for these are, the close
relatedness and similar brain structure and activities in humans and non-human animals.
Humans cannot experience certain mental states if certain parts of the brain are not
functioning. The existence of similar neurological structures in animals constitutes evidence
that they can have the same mental states than humans. This conclusion can be reinforced
by evidence that physiology is also similarly in both parties.
Transcendence implies self-consciousness and both imply continuity and discontinuity
with the environment, i.e. variance with regard the world and the self. Non-sentient or
rudimentary sentient beings have an invariant and largely continuous relationship with the
world. Transcendence breaks the continuity, brings distance between the self and
environment. In a continental way of speaking, it means ‘that you know that you know’
and that you give meaning and content to the environment by means of successful
interactions. Without this ability, many actions of higher primates and dolphins would not
make sense. They have a wide scope of intention and can see forward to following mediate
series and even end-goals. It is indeed connected with knowledge and rationality and they
have shown that they can readily form a broad and complex concept when placed in a
situation (Jonas 1984).

Thus the idea of self-awareness upon which your theory of sentience and non-use by humans is based, would have been regarded as ridiculous at one time, but is now a reasonable position -- precisely because of the evolution of the idea of sentience. My only point was that the same could happen with respect to plants.

Reference: http://vfu-www.vfu.cz/acta-vet/vol73/73-539.pdf

sheepdog wrote:I need not be concerned about whether I eat too much salad or not because I cannot know whether I eat too much salad or not. As such it does not matter whether eating too much salad is harmful or not because any harm that may be caused, based on considerations of caloric intake, is necessary harm -- harm that is necessary -- in the clear sense that it cannot be avoided, because it cannot be known.

Unintentional harm is necessary harm, because it is without intention, that is, without choice. It cannot be avoided.

sheepdog wrote:I fear we disposed of the salad problem too quickly though. Even assuming plants are not sentient it appears the problem that you posed is a trivial example of wastefulness. If we were to change the example to someone who purchased a truckload of salad every day and spent the day putting it down garbage disposals, that would make the waste of it clearer.

Certainly, wastefulness is immoral. The salad had to be grown somewhere and when harvested there were animals caught in the harvest. Even if grown indoors the greenhouse was put on land taken from animal habitat. The disposal of the salad creates effluent that harms water environments for those who live there.

So, in fact, the salad problem is immoral for reasons of wastefulness, albeit a trivial example.

I understand what you're saying about the wastefulness, but not your earlier statement about unintentional harm being necessary harm, because it is without intention and cannot be avoided. Maybe you're using a different definition of "unintentional" but I'm pretty sure a lot of omnivores do not intend to harm non-human animals, yet they cause a lot of unnecessary harm. Are you saying that it is necessary for as long as they are doing it out of ignorance?

panthera wrote:I understand what you're saying about the wastefulness, but not your earlier statement about unintentional harm being necessary harm, because it is without intention and cannot be avoided. Maybe you're using a different definition of "unintentional" but I'm pretty sure a lot of omnivores do not intend to harm non-human animals, yet they cause a lot of unnecessary harm. Are you saying that it is necessary for as long as they are doing it out of ignorance?

"Necessary (unnecessary)" is a very slippery word. I have been reading "Moral Menagerie"

http://www.amazon.com/Moral-Menagerie-PHILOSOPHY-ANIMAL-RIGHTS/dp/0252073606

and the author raises this as a major problem, also.

So what should we mean by "necessary"? The reason that it is slippery is because people choose what it means. The hunter says that it is "necessary" to hunt to manage wild populations. The vivisectionist says it is "necessary" to use animals in research. But this use of the word defeats the meaning intended when used in the context of "no unnecessary harm".

We cannot choose what is and what is not harm because harm is relative to what we are.
"Harm" has different meanings depending upon whether you are a bird or a fish or a person. I cannot choose to say, "I have harmed the fish by keeping it from flying." That makes no sense. But I can say, "I have harmed the bird by keeping it from flying." We cannot choose what "harm" means. It is given.

Similarly the right usage for necessary in this context is consistent with the definition, "Such as must be; impossible to be otherwise; not to be avoided; inevitable." That is to say, necessary means that there is no power of choice involved. There is no alternative to the situation as it is. If there is no alternative, then it doesn't matter what intention I have.

I do not eat meat by choice because it seems to me that to eat meat is to cause harm unnecessarily. My choice is the result of my intention not to eat meat. I intend not to eat meat and therefore I choose not to.

But if I were stranded on a desert island and the only thing to eat were wild boar, while I still intended not to eat meat, I would none-the-less kill and eat the wild boar. The harm I cause by this becomes necessary, no matter what my intention may be. The harm is unintentional in this sense.

You have pointed to a very important point of confusion, though. We should be clear when using the word "necessary" what perspective applies. From the perspective of the individual it is possible that someone eats meat and is ignorant of the harm it does, and in this case the harm may be considered necessary because she does not have a reason not to eat meat and thus has no basis for making any other choice. But from the perspective of the whole society, it isn't reasonable to argue that the harm is not known -- that the entire society is ignorant of the harm. So while individuals may be blameless, a society cannot use the excuse of ignorance to claim that the harm meat eating causes is necessary as a social norm.

We work to resolve this injustice according to the immediate context. When dealing with individuals we make sure they become educated about the harm it causes to dispel individual ignorance. This converts necessary harm into unnecessary. When dealing with the society as a whole we make sure to point out that basic morality requires social norms to be consistent with no unnecessary harm, which is violated by meat eating.

I learned a lot by thinking about your post and sorry if this was a long-winded response.